Over the past 24 hours, Tripoli has witnessed a rapid escalation in armed confrontations involving key factions aligned with the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Special Deterrence Force (SDF). This bout of violent clashes began Tuesday evening, when directives from Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeiba had mandated the evacuation by the SDF-affiliated Judicial Security Apparatus of several critical facilities: the Maqarr al-Naqliyya (Transport Authority), al-Sijn al-Maftouh (Open Prison), and Istirahat al-Sindibad (known locally as “al-Rajma”).
Under an agreement with Judicial Security Apparatus leader Osama Njem – which included a clause ensuring that Souq al-Jumaa and Mitiga would not be entered – 444 Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza deployed elements of his military intelligence to secure the vacated sites. These units, easily identified by their green double-cabin vehicles, took control of key locations, with the handovers initially portrayed as battlefield gains. At the same time, the SDF began reaching out to armed factions in Zawiya and the wider western region, seeking to build support against what it described as a bid by GNU PM Dbeiba to install Misratan and Zintani figures in critical security and political posts. SDF’s outreach to factions outside Tripoli (as well as Tajura) reportedly involved proposals to replace Dbeiba altogether and appoint a more favorable interim prime minister.
At the same time, the SDF mobilized its social support base in Souq al-Jumaa and Tripoli’s eastern districts, particularly along Tariq al-Shatt. Light weapons were distributed, and groups were instructed to erect roadblocks and burn tires in areas such as ‘Arada. While disruptive, the mobilization also served as cover for repositioning toward al-Rajma compound – despite its designation for a peaceful handover under prior arrangements.
Following this escalation, Hamza initiated a phased withdrawal. Military intelligence units pulled out first, followed by 444 forces retreating from the prison and Maqarr al-Naqliyya – which they had begun to occupy. The SDF and Judicial Security swiftly moved back in, presenting the reoccupation in media outlets as a forceful reclaiming and symbolic victory.
Clashes resumed shortly after. Fighting broke out between the SDF and 444 Brigade in Maqarr al-Naqliyya in Ain Zara, Ras Hassan, and the vicinity of Nadi al-Ittihad. As part of its counteroffensive, the SDF deployed retrofitted commercial drones and used drone-assisted targeting to strike strategic 444 positions – including its main base in Tekebali. This campaign was not aimed at territorial expansion but at forcing 444 to advance and stretch its lines (worth noting that the 444 had already been involved in battles to seize control over Abu Salim one night prior), inflict battlefield losses, and win time for potential allies to reassess their stance. It also sought to restore internal morale following initial setbacks. Hostilities persisted through the night, with 444 forces maintaining core positions and responding with heavy fire.
At dawn, the conflict widened. Units from the 111 Brigade, 166 Brigade, and the General Security Apparatus – which by then had organized their ranks – launched a coordinated assault on SDF-aligned positions in Ghiran. GNU-affiliated forces advanced beyond al-Mahari (Radisson Blu), while additional 444 elements moved in from Ras Hassan.
Under increasing pressure from a wider coalition of groups, SDF fighters withdrew toward Mitiga while maintaining forward positions in key eastern neighborhoods, including Treeg al-Shok, ‘Awdat al-Hayat roundabout, and al-Istiraha al-Hamra. During this phase, the SDF also requested a brief humanitarian pause to evacuate civilians caught near the fighting around Mitiga.
Simultaneously, former Stability Support Apparatus units re-emerged, including factions led by Shalfouh, Osama Tellish, and elements loyal to al-Madghouta. These forces – many of which had taken refuge in Mitiga the night prior – attempted to re-establish a presence in Abu Salim.
Overnight, in a boost to the SDF following its outreach to external allies, a coalition of Zawiya-based fighters—affiliated with Mohamed Bahroun al-Far, Mohamed Sifaw, Othman Lhab, Busriba-aligned elements, and Mahmoud Ben Rjab—advanced via Janzour toward Siyahiya in support of the SDF against the GNU-aligned coalition. Their mobilization aimed to relieve pressure on SDF positions and divide GNU-aligned forces by opening an additional axis of confrontation. A clash with Zintani units stationed in Gergaresh would have significantly limited the latter’s capacity to reinforce the 111 Brigade, 444 Brigade, and the Joint Force.
To round out the picture, major Misratan armed groups – beyond the Joint Force – have notably refrained from direct involvement in the current hostilities. Their caution is partly driven by the risk of an eastern escalation, especially after rumors circulated the previous night suggesting that the LAAF had begun deploying armored units westward toward Sirte. Just as significant is an internal divide within Misrata over the political costs of backing the GNU PM in his efforts to consolidate control over Tripoli. Many Misratan military leaders assessed that deeper involvement in these operations would likely have caused reputational damage within the capital, where perceptions of Misratan and Zintani overreach remain deeply ingrained – particularly given that the 2014 Libyan “civil war” and associated conflict in Tripoli is widely viewed as a direct consequence of those factions’ attempt to dominate Tripoli by force.
As of Wednesday noon, a tentative ceasefire has been brokered. The decision came under mounting public pressure as the scale of destruction in central and affluent neighborhoods – Zawiyat Dahmani, Ben Ashour, Jraba, and Tariq al-Shatt – provoked a sharp backlash. The use of airstrikes, heavy artillery, and small arms in these areas, long considered insulated from direct fighting (even during the year-long 2019-20 offensive on Tripoli Khalifa Haftar had launched), triggered a rapid erosion of support for the GNU and its coalition.
However, the truce remains fragile. With frontlines still volatile and core political disputes unresolved, the risk of renewed confrontation remains high – a disastrous prospect for Tripoli’s civilian population caught in the crosshairs. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) issued a delayed call for a cessation of hostilities – an intervention that came too late to shape the early trajectory of the conflict. This belated response highlighted what appears to have been a broader misreading of the situation or an overly hands-off approach, likely stemming from an overestimation of the coherence and military momentum of the GNU-aligned coalition. Going forward, it is critical that the SRSG and UNSMIL are granted the political backing and operational space needed to actively mediate between the parties – not only to prevent a relapse into open conflict, but to initiate a credible de-escalation process grounded in negotiated security guarantees, clear rules of engagement, and broader security sector reform. This security-focused effort must be closely aligned with UNSMIL’s political outreach and shuttle diplomacy – lest de-escalation measures become detached from the political drivers of the conflict, and any short-term calm give way to a deeper, more entrenched cycle of violence with more stakeholders joining a renewed bout of destructive warfare.
